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In the summer of 1998, the Khartoum government and
John Garang of the Sudan PeopleÕs Liberation Move-
ment (SPLM) signed a temporary ceasefire in order that
international aid could reach the war-torn areas. Some
discussion has also taken place regarding the institution
of a new constitution, which would include the political
clauses of the 1997 Agreement. Although there is no
easy solution to the conflict in Sudan, one aspect seems
clear: if there is to be peace within the country, a political
settlement must be both achievable and sustainable.
Moves Toward
Conflict Resolution
in Sudan
The civil war that has raged in Sudan, apart
from a brief respite during the Jaafar Nimeiri
period since 1955, is estimated to have cost 1.3
million lives. A Peace Agreement was signed on
21 April 1997, between the Sudanese govern-
ment, under the leadership of President el-
Bashir, and the United Democratic Salvation
Front (UDSF), comprising the South Sudan Inde-
pendence Movement (SSIM), the Union of
Sudan African Parties (USAP), the Sudan Peo-
pleÕs Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Equato-
ria Defence Force and the South Sudan Inde-
pendence Group (SSIG). Although the agree-
ment does not include the governmentÕs chief
opponents, Colonel John GarangÕs Sudan Peo-
pleÕs Liberation Army (SPLA), or the leader of the
exiled Umma Party, El-Sadiq el-Mahdi, it does
outline a number of political issues, which, if
resolved, could provide the basis for a move
towards a conflict resolution.
Ethnicity and religion are seen as integral fac-
tors in the war: a predominantly Arab-African,
Muslim North against an animist or Christian
black African South. Certainly ethnicity and reli-
gion are major contemporary factors, but their
origins are historic. The 1962 Missionary Act
prevented the spread of Islam to the south of
the country and forged a religious tension with-
in the country. By 1983 and with the institution
of s h a r i a law, tensions were exacerbated. From
that time, State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gabriel Roric believes, minority rights became
confused with religious rights. Yet it would be
erroneous to generalize about the conflict in
such terms as Ôthe North-South ConflictÕ or
ÔIslam versus ChristianityÕ or ÔArabism versus
AfricanismÕ. In Sudan, the issue of nation forma-
tion, regionalism, ethnicity, religion, and eco-
nomic justice Ôhave been left to accumulate
over time, without being resolvedÕ.1
The civil war is essentially concerned with two
fundamental issues: firstly, the identity of the
Sudanese state and secondly, the question of
who gains control over the natural resources of
the south. Because of the areaÕs reserves of oil,
hardwoods and minerals and vast tracts of
unexplored land, the economic potential of the
south has been seen as the key objectives for all
parties. Yet ethnic diversity is complex in Sudan.
The 1996 census reported a population of 27
million people. According to an earlier census
conducted in 1955/56, the only one that includ-
ed ethnic origin, there are 19 major ethnic
groups. These groups can be further divided
into 597 smaller sub-groupings, speaking over
100 different languages. Around 60 per cent of
the population are Muslim; 15 per cent are
Christian and the remainder adhere to tradition-
al religions. The demographic composition has
been altered through years of civil war and eco-
logical disaster, but one of the important
aspects of the April 1997 Peace Agreement is
that it attempts to address some of these socio-
ethnic imbalances through its federal structure.
The Peace Agreement,
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The general principles contained in the
peace agreement signed on 21 April 1997, aim
to attain a Ôjust and lasting peaceÕ. The docu-
ment declares that Ôonly a sustainable peace
based on justice, equality, democracy and free-
dom can lead to a meaningful development
and progress which would assist in the solu-
tion of the fundamental problems of the peo-
ple of Sudan.Õ Concerning the basic issue of the
relationship between religion and the State,
the agreement states that Sudan is a multi-
racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-
religious society. Islam is the religion of the
majority of the population, and Christianity
and the African creeds are followed by a con-
siderable number of citizens. Nevertheless, the
basis of rights and duties shall be citizenship,
and all Sudanese shall equally share in all
aspects of life and political responsibilities.
The status of s h a r i a is arguably the most con-
tentious constitutional issue and its repeal has
continually been called for by the SPLA as a
conditional step if negotiations are to take
place between the SPLA and the government.
On the crucial issue of s h a r i a, the parties to the
April agreement decided on a complex formu-
la. Laws of a general nature that were based on
general principles common to the states
would apply at the national level, provided
that the states had the right to enact any com-
plementary federal legislation on matters
peculiar to them. In other words, s h a r i a w o u l d
not be abandoned at the national level but it
was not to intrude to the governance of the
regions. 
The terms of the rights and freedoms accord-
ed to every person are far reaching and would
not be out of place in a liberal democracy. Yet
Hasan Turabi asserts that the emphasis in the
Sudanese model of Islam is on Ôrights and
obligationsÕ in which there is no coercion but
equally Ôno freedom of will in the Western
senseÕ. 
The relationship between religious identity,
citizenship, and the State is critical. Particularly
significant is the idea of religious freedom
based on the principle that affords the individ-
ual not only the right to choose for himself or
herself, but also the protection against any
compulsion. In a sense, this right grants the
general population individual freedom. It also
represents a commitment on the part of both
the State and the organizations within civil
society to ensure and enhance political rights.
SudanÕs political system has organized struc-
tures and processes of decision-making.
D r Ghazi Salahuddin Alabani, the Secretary
General to the Congress, describes the system
as containing the Ôbare rudiments of a democ-
ratic systemÕ. The Western pluralist model is
seen as too divisive but the Sudanese system
does involve a range of representatives from
trade unions, professional associations, tribal
chiefs and so on, who tend to become involved
at the state level. Ideas can be individualistic
without party discipline but this structure is
regarded as more democratic than previous
governments with political parties which Ôwere
never representativeÕ.
One cause of conflict within the country has
been identified as regional inequity with
regard to the distribution of productive assets,
and educational health and social services. The
Peace Agreement contains a section dealing
with wealth sharing, one clause of which
states: ÔThe federal government shall lay down
a comprehensive economic and social plan to
develop the country in general and to bridge
the gap between the various states in particu-
lar, so that within a definite period, a parity in
provision of basic needs such as security,
employment, water, food, education, health
and housing could be reachedÕ.
In order to consolidate economic policies,
SudanÕs economy is moving towards a free
market focus. Hassan Turabi refers to the coun-
tryÕs privatizing economy as one which aims to
be more efficient. Emphasis is now placed on
the productivity of farmers and agricultural
improvement, and the government has given
the production of food for domestic and
regional consumption priority status. Women
are encouraged to cultivate their land, grow
food and exchange and barter in cooperation
stores. As women became more productive in
home agricultural pursuits such as growing
food, keeping chickens and so on, large-scale
acreage can be devoted to growing cash crops
which earn foreign currency through exports. 
The country, however, faces difficulty in
looking towards an expansion of its productive
base when previous productivity has been low.
The lack of basic commodities such as petrol
holds back efficient production. In addition,
there have been major problems in gaining
foreign investment since the Gulf War and the
countryÕs deteriorating relationship with the
IMF. Sudan looks to the Middle East, China, and
Malaysia to provide external funding, but that
may not be quite so readily forthcoming now
that the economies of South East Asia are in
trouble. More generally, some Sudanese com-
mentators suggest that liberalizing the econo-
my is undesirable and may fuel Ôold fears of
ethnic exclusion from positions of power and
wealthÕ. ÔThe government must be cautious in
its privatization programme. Otherwise, dis-
posing of commercial enterprizes will give
undue advantage to capital rich, better posi-
tioned and well-established Northern mer-
chants and industrialists whom, rightly or
wrongly, non-Northerners in the South, East,
and West consider to be responsible for their
economic miseries and whom they eye with
suspicion and jealousyÕ.2
Although the Agreement is for an interim
period of four years, it can be shortened or
lengthened according to the recommenda-
tions from the Coordinating Council. The remit
of the Council is broad. The Coordinating
Council is responsible for supervision, socio-
economic planning, confidence building,
peace nurturing, policy making and political
mobilization. It is accountable to President el-
Bashir and provides a link between the govern-
ment and the Southern States. In order to be
viewed as non-partial and impartial, its compo-
sition must reflect an appropriate balance
between the different parties in the conflict.
The security arrangements during the inter-
im period of the Agreement are particularly
important in establishing the basic elements of
conflict resolution. The South Sudan Defence
Force (SSDF) will remain separate from the
National Army and will be stationed in their
locations under their command. However,
police, prisons, civil defence, and public securi-
ty in the Southern States will be drawn from
the people of the area and the presence of the
Sudanese armed forces will be reduced once
violence has stopped. A joint Ceasefire Com-
mission is to be established to monitor cease-
fire violations and the disengagement of
troops in the Southern States. 
The Agreement also accedes to the right of
the peoples of Southern Sudan to Ôdetermine
their political aspirations and pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural developmentÕ
through the process of a referendum to be
held before the end of the interim period. The
options contained in the referendum will pre-
sent a choice between either unity or seces-
sion. 
C o n c l u s i o n
The perennial conflict in Sudan has hardly
created an environment conducive to the rem-
edying of economic disparities and social
injustice. The Peace Agreement of April 1997 is
of course, only partial, in that its signatories
represent a segment of the range of opposi-
tionists within the country. The central ques-
tion is how likely is the agreement to result in a
measure of success? As Dr Atabani, Secretary
General of the National Congress asserts, ÔGov-
ernment is not divine. The government is
accountable to the people ultimatelyÕ. In a
sense, the 1997 Agreement has gone some
way towards demonstrating an understanding
of the problems confronting different groups
within Sudan and in identifying a number of
key political aspects, all which could help
lessen tensions and offer the possibility of a
Ôsuitable peaceÕ for all people. '
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